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Comments
CIVIL DISABILITY-WHEN DOES IT BEGIN?

In the practice of the law an interesting problem has recently presented itself.
The case arose in this fashion: A man was injured in an accident involving a city
bus line and brought suit against the bus line. In preparing for suit, the attorneys
for the bus line learned that the injured man had been convicted of sodomy and
was out on bail pending appeal at the time he received the injury. Subsequently,
the parties arrived at a settlement, a stipulation was filed and at this point the crux
of the situation was reached. The attorneys for the defendant wanted to get some
protection for their client so that there would be no danger of another suit being
filed for the same cause of action. They applied to the court for the appointment
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of a trustee to act on behalf of the convicted man which was, of course, refused because under. Section 9229, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), there was no authority
for such an appointment.
Several alternatives presented themselves. They could either take a release, a
covenant not to sue or an indemnity from some third party. The latter would have
been feasible except that there were no financially responsible persons willing to
indemnify the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. The other two are basically contractual and the question is whether one sentenced to a term of years in the
penitentiary and while out on bail pending appeal has the ability to contract.
The application of two Missouri statutes causes the difficulty. Section 9225
reads: "A sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term less than life
suspends all civil rights of the persons so sentenced during the term thereof, and forfeits all public offices and trust, authority and power; and the person sentenced to
such imprisonment for life shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead." Section 9229,
as amended in 1945, reads: "Whenever any person shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary, a trustee, to take charge of and manage his estate, may be appointed
by the circuit court of the county in which such convict last resided; or if he have no
known place of residence, then by the circuit court of the county in which the conviction was had, on the application of the wife of the convict, or any of her relatives,
or any relative of the convict, or any creditor of such convict.",
In addition to the power to contract, a number of other questions can be
considered: 1. Does such a convict have the ability to sue or be sued? 2. Assuming that he does not, would a judgment rendered either for or against him be
void and, hence, subject to collateral attack, or merely voidable and subject only to
direct attack? 3. If he does not sue, does the sentence toll the running of the
statute of limitations against him?
The basic question, the answer to which would solve all the subsidiary problems, is: When does the civil disability of a convict start? Is it at the moment of
sentence according to the wording of Section 9225, or is it at the time of actual incarceration in the penitentiary in spite of the apparent wording of Section 9225?
If the first and literal construction is adopted, the rights of a person convicted of a
felony are suspended under. Section 9225 on sentence, but no trustee can be appointed under Section 9229 until he is imprisoned. Neither the basic question nor
the particular one stated at the beginning of this comment seems to have been directly answered in this jurisdiction; however, an analysis of analagous situations and
some of the subsidiary questions as answered both in this and other jurisdictions
may help to arrive at a prediction of what the Missouri court would do if this specific case were presented to it.
At common law one convicted of treason or any other felony was conceived
to be civilly dead. 2 However, absent a statute civil death is generally denied in
1. Italics in both sections added by the author. These statutes are now Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 222.010 and 460.010 (1949), respectively.

2.
(1948).

Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888); 34 VA. L. REv. 463
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Approximately one third of the states have passed civil death

The early cases indicated that civil disability of a convict attached upon passing
of sentence. In Miller v. Finkel,5 the New York court said by way of dictum under
a New York statute, providing that "A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison
for any term less than for life suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced,"
that the disqualification commences, as does the running of the time of imprisonment, from the moment of passing sentence. 6
The Missouri case of Presbury v. HwIur turned on the fact that Missouri Revised Statutes, 1855, p. 642, Section 22 (suspending civil rights) did not apply to
convictions in federal courts but the court said by way of dictum: "It is of no
consequence that Wolff's offense might have been punished by a state court (if it
be so), for it is not the fact of criminality which, in any case, suspends his rights,
but the conviction and sentence to the penitentiary."s
Despite these early indications, it is now likely that suspension of civil rights
begins not upon passing of sentence but upon actual incarceration.0 The Missouri
case of Cole v. American Ry. Express Co.10 particularly held that one sentenced to
a term in the penitentiary but out on parole had the power to sue. Here Cole
brought action for loss of hogs in shipment against the defendant express company.
Three months prior to this civil suit he had received a conditional commutation of
his sentence. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff being under sentence to the penitentiary for a term less than life had access to the courts only through a trustee.
The court after referring to the statute suspending civil rights and then citing the
section providing for appointment of a trustee said: ". . It is our opinion that the
section last mentioned did not preclude the plaintiff herein from maintaining this
suit, in his own proper person, for the reason that he was at the time of trial thereof
under parole, issued by the Governor of Missouri. . . . In the case at baf
respondent, Cole, at the time of the trial in circuit court was not actually imprisoned,
and it therefore devolved upon him to protect his rights involved herein.""'

3.

Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927); 50 HARv. L. REV.

968, 970 (1937); 34 VA. L. REv. 463, 464 (1949); 48 YALE L. J. 912 (1939).

4. Mo. REv. STAT. 1939, §§ 9225 et seq.; see notes 34 VA. L. REv. 463,

465 (1948); 48 YALE L. J. 912, 916 (1939), concluding that the judicial tendency
to limit the operation of these statutes is highly desirable. It is significant that Mo.
REv. STAT. § 9228 (1939), providing for administration of estates of convicts imprisoned for life, was repealed by Mo. Laws 1945, p. 1333, § 1.
5. 1 Park Cr. R. 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
6. Id at 377.
7. 34 Mo. 29 (1863).
8. Id. at 34.
9. Martin v. Long, 92 W. Va. 624, 115 S.E. 791 (1923). 18 C.J.S., Convicts,
§ 6, p. 105: "However, under particular statutes rendering a convict civilly dead,
he may be entirely, or to a limited extent, unable to contract, although the disability does not take effect pending an appeal from the conviction, or until his
imprisonment actually begins."
10. 228 Mo. App. 78, 68 S.W.2d 736 (1934).
11. 228 Mo. App. 78, 68 S.W.2d 736, 740 (1934).
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In Cray v. Gray, the convict was being sued for divorce while he was in
prison. The court held that he could be sued even though actually incarcerated but
that it was desirable for an attorney to be appointed to look after his interest, particularly if property interests are involved. This latter indication seems to have
been more rigidly construed to the benefit of the convict in the later decisions. For
instance in McLaughn v. McLaughlin,- the plaintiff was convicted of murder in
1897 and sentenced to ten years in the penitentairy. He remained in the penitentiary
from 1898 to 1904 when he was granted a pardon. In 1902 while plaintiff was in
the penitentiary, defendant brought suit for divorce and alimony as well as the care
and custody of the children. In the decree, land was divested from plaintiff. The
court held that the judgment divesting title from plaintiff was void on its face since
plaintiff was in the penitentiary.
In Murphy v. Baron,14 Murphy was convicted of a felony and sentenced to a
term in the state penitentiary. He received another sentence in 1903 and was confined until 1905. In 1904 while Murphy was so confined, Baron recovered a judgment for possession of the land. The court held that the action by which Baron
recovered was void.
In Wamsley v. Snow,15 Snow was sentenced to life in the penitentiary for murder. He was confined pending appeal. During this time, special execution and sale
were levied against him. This execution and sale were held void, the court saying:
"The purpose of the statute is to protect the property rights of a convict while he
is incarcerated in the penitentiary. The fact that, while defendant was in the
penitentiary, an appeal was pending from the conviction and sentence did not
change the situation. He would have been as helpless to defend his rights in a
civil case as if no appeal had been taken. . . . Incarcerated he could not defend in
person. . . . While defendant was confined in the penitentiary, he was entitled to
the protection of the provisions of the statute."
On the other hand in Jandro v. jandro,16 a convict had married while in
prison. Suit for annulment was allowed against him while still imprisoned on the
ground that a convict may not enter into a marriage contract.
As concerns the right of a convict to be sued it seems to make a difference
whether property interests are involved are not. If they are, and he is incarcerated,
it seems that he cannot be sued. If only a status is to be determined, he may be.
But in all these cases whether the right to sue or to be sued is in issue the court
seems to emphasize the element of actual incarceration as the determinative factor.
Cases involving conveyances of land help to throw some light on the judicial
tendency with respect to these civil disability statutes. It seems that Missouri and
Rhode Island are the only states in which it is definitely held that a convict may

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

104
228
275
331
246

Mo. App. 520 (1904).
Mo. 635, 129 S.W. 21 (1910).
Mo. 282, 205 S.W. 49 (1918).
Mo. 261, 53 S.W.2d 258 (1932).
S.W. 609 (Mo. App. 1923).
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not convey.17 In Williams v. Shackelford, 8 Williams had been convicted of a felony
and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of years. While in the penitentiary, he
executed a mortgage deed under which the plaintiffs claimed title. The court quoted
the civil disability statutes and said that the effect of these provisions is to "deprive
him of the power of alienating or encumbering his property during the term of his
sentence of imprisonment... in the case of a convict felon for a term of years, it is
suspended during the term of his imprisoment, unless transmitted ad interim to a
Williams had no power to execute the deed . . . while a convict in the
trustee ....
penitentiary serving his term for a felony."
However, in Ward v. Morton'9 cited in the Cole case, supra, plaintiff was sentenced to prison for felony. No appeal was taken nor was a guardian or trustee
appointed for him. At the time of sentence he was paroled for four years, was never
incarcerated in the penitentiary but allowed to remain at large. Defendant offered a deed executed by plaintiff and his wife during the time of his parole. Plaintiff cited Williams v. Shackelford, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, and Murpvy v. Baron,
supra. The court said: "In all cases cited by plaintiff the person whose property
was affected was actually confined in the penitentiary at the time the judgment was
rendered or the conveyance was executed. The underlying reason upon which each
of the adjudications were predicated was that, while in custody, a convict is prevented from attending to his affairs and the statute has therefore provided a method
by which his property may be protected and preserved . .. even though application
for the appointment of a trustee to represent his estate had been made, the court
would have been powerless to act for the reason that Section 2297 provides that a
trustee may be appointed only 'upon producing a copy of the sentence, duly certified, and satisfactory evidence that suck convict is actually imprisoned under such
sentence' . . . under the circumstances plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of
the statute providing for the management and administration of the estates of convicts by a trustee appointed for that purpose. The duty devolved upon plaintiff to
protect the title to his property." The court then cited Harmon v. Bowers20 with
approval.
In Harmon v. Bowers,2 ' Harmon on April 12, 1904, was sentenced to the penitentiary and appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court. From that date until January
19, 1905, he was at liberty under. bond, on which date he was taken to the penitentiary where he remained until January 12, 1906 when he was pardoned and
discharged. After his conviction and sentence but before he was taken to tho
penitentiary, Harmon and his wife made the deed in question. Section 2301, Kansas
General Statutes (1901), read: "A sentence of confinement and hard labor for a
term less than life suspends all civil rights of the person so sentenced during the

17.
R.I. 590,
18.
19.
20.
21.

Note, 48 YALE L. J. 912, 914, n. 14 (1939). Cf. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18
30 AtL 470 (1894), where a statute expressly forbade conveyance.
97 Mo. 322, 11 S.W. 222 (1888).
294 Mo. 408, 242 S.W. 966 (1922).
78 Kan. 135, 96 Pac. 51 (1908).
Ibid.
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term thereof. .. ." Sections 5776 and 5777 provided for appointment of a trustee
upon satisfactory evidence that the convict was actually imprisoned. The court
said: "From these provisions it appears that civil rights are not suspended until
the convict is imprisoned. If we should hold that civil rights are suspended the
moment sentence is pronounced, the defendant's punishment would be increased by
taking away his civil rights for an indefinite period in excess of the term of imprisonment, which does not begin until the stay allowed upon appeal has expired
and he is imprisoned, or, possibly, when he is in custody to be conveyed to the
penitentiary."
In Martin v. Long,22 the defendant had been convicted of a felony, had appealed and was out on bond. While at liberty and pending appeal, he entered into a
contract with the plaintiff. Plaintiff performed his part of the contract and sued defendant on the contract. Defendant set up his disability to contract. A committee
had been appointed to act for defendant pursuant to Section 11, c. 163, West Virginia Code (Barnes, 1918), which read: "When a person is sentenced to confinement
in the penitentiary for more than one year, the estate of such convict, if he have
any, both real and personal, shall, on the motion of any party interested, be committed by the county court of the county, in which his estate, or some part thereof
may be, to a person selected by such county court, who, after giving bond before
the said county court in such penalty as said court may prescribe, shall have charge
of said real estate until such convict is discharged from such confinement."
The upper court held the committee improperly appointed. They cited Harmon
v. Bowers, supra, but said it was not very helpful since based on different facts and
different statutes. The West Virginia case turned upon whether the committee had
been properly appointed or more broadly whether defendant was sui juris in respect
to his property rights while he was out on bail pending appeal. According to the
wording of the statute, authorization to appoint a committee to have charge of a
convict's property was given by virtue of the convict's sentence. However, the
court came to the conclusion that in spite of the apparent meaning of this statute
a committee could not be appointed until the convict was actually imprisoned. The
basis for the decision seems to be that pending appeal and while defendant was out
on bail the state "had no control over defendant's person. ... No one but his surety
on his bail bond could take him into custody because of that judgment. He could
do so because he was on his bond, but his right to do so did not at all arise from
the judgment, but because of the bond. . . . The judgment or sentence being
stayed, the state had no rights thereunder that could be enforced during the stay,
23
either as to his person or his estate."
One out on bail is not under such a disability as to toll running of the statute
24
of limitations. This was held in the leading case of Hyde v. Nelson cited as
22. 92 W. Va. 624, 115 S.E. 791 (1923).
23. Id. at 793.
24. 287 Mo. 130, 229 S.W. 201 (1921). See also Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S.
564, 5 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1885); Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.. 339, 40 Sup. Ct. 537
(1920); Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401 (C.C.A. 1911); Palmer v. State, 170
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/3
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authority in Rose v. Washington Times Co. Both of these cases involved actions
for libel in which the cause of action accrued while the plaintiff was out on bail. In
the Hyde case, the court quoted the limitations disability statute, Section 1323,
MissouriRevised Statutes (1919), and said: "There can be no doubt that the word
'imprisonment'is used in this section in its plain, ordinary meaning. 'Imprisonment'
is--'The act of putting or confining a man in prison; the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his
powers of locomotion.' ,,26
It would seem relatively safe to predict that the Missouri court would say
if the question were presented to it that a convict out on bail pending appeal can
sue, following the Cole, 'Martin and Ward cases; that he can be sued even though
incarcerated if property interests are not involved, but if both of these factors are
present, such a judgment against him is void; that mere sentence without actual incarceration does not toll running of the statute of limitations; that he can convey
land; that he can contract under the reasoning of the Martin and Ward cases which
approved Harmon v. Bowers; in short, that civil disability does not arise under Section 9225 until actual imprisonment.

Although such a prediction seems reasonable based upon these prior decisions, it
is respectfully suggested that the legislature take all the guess work out of the
matter, follow the judicial tendency and make it clear by a rewording of Section
922527 that at least all private civil rights such as those mentioned above in this
article be not suspended until actual imprisonment. It may be deemed socially desirable to draw a distinction between these rights and those such as the right to vote
or hold public office which perhaps should be suspended in the interest of the public
with the passing of sentence.
JOHN W. INGLISH*

POSSESSION AS NOTICE UNDER MISSOURI RECORDING

Acr

The question of whether or not possession of realty under an unrecorded deed
or other instrument imparts notice of the possessor's interest in the realty to a
subsequent purchaser of the realty from the last record title holder has caused more
litigation in Missouri than in most other states. This is attributable in part to the
wording of the Missouri recording act and the interpretation placed upon it by the
courts of this state. Another factor which probably has had some causal effect in
bringing about some of the litigation of this question is the language sometimes

Ala. 102, 54 So. 271 (1910); Spring v. Dahlman, 34 Neb. 692, 52 N.W. 567 (1892);

29 C.J. 22.
25. 23 F.2d 993 (App. D. C. 1928).
26. Hyde v. Nelson, 287 Mo. 130, 229 S.W. 200, 201 (1921), quoting 21 Cyc.
1742.
27. Now Mo. REV. STAT. § 222.010 (1949). See supra n. 1.

*Attorney,Jefferson City, and former student editor. of the Review. A.B. 1947,
LL.B. 1950, University of Missouri.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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used by the courts of this state; this language standing alone does not indicate
the difference between the Missouri law on the matter as set forth by the leading
cases and the law of other states. Whether or not such a distinction should be
present, the fact remains that the Missouri act is differently worded from those of
most other states and on the basis of this the courts have in the leading cases interpreted it differently.
There are three common types of recording acts throughout the United
States. These statutes may be grouped as follows: (1) those giving priority to the
bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of realty who first records his deed, or the race
type statute;" (2) those giving priority to a subsequent bona fide purchaser unless
he has notice of a prior unrecorded instrument; 2 and (3) those protecting a subsequent bona fide purchaser unless he has actual notice of a prior unrecorded instrument. 3 Under both of the first two types of statutes it is generally held as a matter
of law that possession alone by a prior purchaser is sufficient notice of the possessor's
interest to a subsequent purchaser, and it is immaterial whether the subsequent
purchaser in fact knew of the possession. 4 But the third type statute, such as those
of Missouri and Massachusetts, requires that the subsequent purchaser have no
actual notice of the prior unrecorded instrument for such purchaser to take free
of the prior instrument. The question whether possession under an unrecorded in1. Wis. STATS. §235.49 (1947). Wisconsin originally had the actual notice
type statute, Wis. REv. STAT. c. 86, § 32 (1858). NEB. REv. STATS. § 76-238 (1943):
"All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing which are required to be or
which under the laws of this state may be recorded, shall take effect and be in force
from and after the time of delivering the same to the register of deeds for recording,
and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith without
notice; and all such deeds, mortgages and other instruments shall be adjudged void
as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice whose deeds, mortgages or other instruments shall be first recorded; Provided, that such deeds, mortgages and other instruments shall be valid between the parties." Most frequently
the controversies arising under this statute are between mortgagees. In the typical
case, M executes a mortgage to El who does not record; M then executes a mortgage
to E2, who has no notice, actual or constructive, of the first mortgage. El then records. Under the race type act El has priority. Under the notice type act E2 has
priority. Missouri has rejected the race type interpretation. White v. Hughes, 88
S.W. 2d 268 (Mo. App. 1935). But see Smith v. Johnson, 107 Mo. 494, 497, 18
S.W. 21, 22 (1891) for dictum that where a grantor delivers two deeds on the same
day to two innocent parties, the first to record has priority.
2. ALA. CODE, Tit. 47 § 120 (1940)---"AlI conveyances of real property, deeds,
mortgages, deeds of trust, or instruments in the nature of mortgages, to secure any
debts, are inoperative and void, as to purchasers for a valuable consideration, mortgagees, and judgment creditors without notice, unless the same have been recorded
before the accrual of the right of such purchasers, mortgagees, or judgment creditors."
3. Mo. REv. STATS. § 442.400 (1949), Mo. REv. STATS. ANN. § 3428--"No
such instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and
such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder for record." MAss. GEN. LAws c. 183, § 4 (1932).
4. Enslen v. Thornton, 182 Ala. 314, 62 So. 525 (1913); Blum v. Poppenhagen, 142 Neb. 5, 12, 5 N.W. 2d 99, 103 (1942); Ehrlich v. Hollingshead, 87
N.Y.S. 2d 682 (4th Dep't. 1949); Phelan v. Brady, 119 N.Y. 587, 23 N.E.
1109 (1890); Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878).
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strument is sufficient notice to a subsequent purchaser without the latter in fact
knowing of the possession has seldom arisen in Massachusetts. In Curtis v. Misndy,
the Massachusetts court held that it was sufficient that the subsequent purchaser
have knowledge of facts which would put the average person upon inquiry. But in
Pomroy v. Stevens,6 the Massachusetts court held that possession was not sufficient
notice even if the subsequent purchaser in fact knew of it, saying: "It is not sufficient to prove facts which would reasonably put him on inquiry. He is not bound
to inquire." Whether or not in Massachusets possession pursuant to an unrecorded
interest is sufficient notice to a subsequent purchaser, it is clear from these cases
that it is not if the subsequent purchaser has no knowledge of the possession.
In Missouri the problem has arisen much more frequently, and the majority
of the cases where the question has been directly in issue hold that knowledge of
possession under a prior unrecorded instrument is evidence to go to the jury of
notice of the outstanding interest to the subsequent purchaser, but is not notice
as a matter of law. But a thorough reading of all the cases on the question and a
close study of the facts involved are necessary to determine the difference between the Missouri law and that of other states.
The first case in Missouri which gave a full and accurate discussion of the
Missouri recording act was Vaughn v. Tracy.7 In that case the plaintiff was in
possession of a mill and a one-acre tract of land upon which the mill stood, under
an unrecorded grant. Subsequently the defendant purchased an eighty-acre tract of
which the one-acre tract in the possession of the plaintiff was a part. The plaintiff
entered evidence which tended to show that the defendant in fact knew of the
plaintiff's possession, but there was no findings of fact on this issue in the record
of the trial court. In discussing what is meant by actual notice as used in the
Missouri recording act, the supreme court said: "We think the legislature here
referred to actual notice as contradistinguished from implied notice, both of which
were well known terms in our law when the act was passed; . . .possession is not,
as the Circuit Court seemed to suppose, as a mere matter of law, actual notice within
the meaning of our recording acts. . . .Actual notice, under our statute, is a fact,
and of course may be proved as any fact, . . . The notice required by the statute is
not certain knowledge, but such information as men generally act upon in the
transactions of life." The court throughout this decision indicated that possession
under an unrecorded instrument is evidence of actual notice to the subsequent
purchaser without further evidence that the subsequent purchaser in fact knew of
the possession. On rehearing of the appeal the court held 8 that possession was not
notice of the possessor's interest as a matter of law, but was evidence of notice of
the possessor's title which should be submitted to the jury, but whether or not this
would be sufficient to satisfy the jury that the purchaser had actual notice "would

S.
6.
7.
Riggin,
8.

44 Mass. (3 Met.) 405 (1841).
52 Mass. (11 Met.) 244 (1846).
22 Mo. 415 (1856), rehearing 25 Mo. 318 (1857).
40 Mo. 405 (1867).
25 Mo. 318 (1857).

In accord: Speck v.
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be a matter for their consideration." In this latter decision the court indicated that
there also must be evidence that the subsequent purchaser in fact knew of the
possession under the unrecorded instrument. In neither of these decisions was the
court definite as to whether evidence of knowledge in fact of the possession is necessary, but later cases follow the rule that there must be evidence that the subsequent
purchaser in fact knew of the possession. This decision was followed in Maupin v.
Emmons.9 In that case the court said that a second sale of property by the grantor
after he has already parted with title is necessarily a fraud, and if it appears in
evidence that the subsequent purchaser knows that the holder of the unrecorded
instrument is in possession of the property as owner, or if he is informed that the
holder of such a deed has bought the property, "the jury has a right to infer full
knowledge or voluntary ignorance; and if he buy with such knowledge or such
mneans of knowledge,10 he becomes a party to the fraud, and will not be permitted
to take advantage of it."
The leading case in Missouri on the subject is Drey v. Doyle."' In that case
the lower court instructed the jury: "By the term 'actual notice' as used in the instructions, the jury are not to understand that plaintiff and said Nelson must have
actually seen the written renewal of said lease, or been informed of its existence.
Knowledge by them of facts, if they had such knowledge as would put an ordinarily
prudent person on inquiry as to the nature of defendant's title, and lead him to
discover the truth respecting the same, is equivalent to actual notice . . . ." The
Missouri Supreme Court upheld this instruction saying that if the subsequent
purchaser is conscious of having the means of knowledge of an adverse claim and
does not use this means of obtaining information, he ought to be charged with such
information as a fair and reasonable inquiry would have disclosed.
Therefore, it seems that although the Vaughn case is still cited as authority in
Missouri, knowledge of possession is something more than mere evidence of actual
notice of the possessor's interest. As a practical matter the jury determines whether
the knowledge of possession is sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry. If it is,
then it will satisfy the requirement of actual notice under our statute if the purchaser could have learned of the possessor's interest by a reasonable inquiry. But it
should be noted that this extends only to such facts as a reasonable inquiry would
have revealed and does not apply where the subsequent purchaser can show that he
12
could not have learned of the outstanding interest by a reasonable inquiry.

9. 47 Mo. 304 (1871).
10. Emphsais added.
11. 99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889).
12. Hallaver v. Lackey, 353 Mo. 1244, 1252, 188 S.W. 2d 30, 34 (1945); Farrington v. Hays, 353 Mo. 194, 182 S.W. 2d 186 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 797
(1945), rehearingdenied 342 U.S. 885 (1945); Langford v. Welton, 48 S.W. 2d 860
(Mo. 1932); Woodbury v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 350 Mo. 527,
166 S.W. 2d 552 (1942). In the Woodbury case the defendant's grantor had used
misappropriated trust funds with which to purchase the land in his own name.
When the defendant purchased, there was a tenant in possession who knew of the
misappropriation. The court held that the possession of the tenant was evidence
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/3
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The rule that knowledge of possession is evidence of actual notice of all that
could be learned by a reasonable inquiry, is limited to the interests of the possessor
in land under his actual or constructive possesion. That is, possession of a part of
a tract of land is not necessarily evidence of the possessor's interest in more than the
portion he possesses, even though inquiry might have revealed interests in the
remaining portion of the tract. Thus in the Vaughn case, the court affirmed the admission into evidence by the lower court of occupancy of one acre of an eighty acre
tract as notice of the possessor's interest in the one acre, but not as to the remainder of the eighty acres. But in Martin v. Jones,' 3 the court held that occupancy
and cultivation of from twelve to fifteen acres was sufficient evidence to infer notice
to the purchaser of the possessor's title to a twenty acre tract.
It was further held in Masterson v. West End R.R.,14 that knowledge of past
possession is not evidence of notice where the possession ends prior to the purchase.
In that case the Railroad had graded some of the land but had ceased operations
some two years before the purchase. The court also stated in that case that there
is no implication in our statute or in case decisions that a purchaser must visit the
premises to determine whether someone is in possession. But in Leavitt v. Laforce,15
the court held that one cannot purposely avoid going on to the premises. In that
case the purchaser had traveled several miles-from Iowa to Missouri-to look over
the land with the intention of taking a mortgage on it, but had viewed it from the
road, and appeared purposely to avoid going close enough to determine whether anyone was in possession. There was also evidence of fraud in the case.
Also to be considered here is whether a subsequent purchaser without notice
taking from the record owner by quitclaim deed or a deed without general warranties
takes free from outstanding interests not of record. It has been held in Missouri
that such purchaser takes subject to all outstanding claims or interests not required to be recorded and that such purchaser is a purchaser with notice because
the absence of general warranties in his deed is sufficient to put him on inquiry. 16
Therefore it was held in Ridgeway v. Holliday,y that one who procured title by
adverse possession, then moved off the land, had good title as against a subsequent
purchaser who took by a deed with special warranties from the record owner even
though the latter was in possession and the purchaser never knew of the adverse
possession. But this rule applies only to interests not subject to the recording
act and does not include claims under instruments which could be recorded.18 It is
to the defendant of the tenant's rights as a tenant but was not evidence of the defects in the grantor's title arising out of the misappropriation of the trust funds and
known to the tenant.
13. 72 Mo. 23 at 26 (1880).
14. 5 Mo. App. 64 (1878), affd. 72 Mo. (1880).
15. 71 Mo. 353 (1879).
16. King v. Fasching, 234 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 1950); McAboy v. Pacher, 353
Mo. 1219, 187 $.W. 2d 207 (1945); Starr v. Bartz, 219 Mo. 47, 117 S.W. 1125
(1909); Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444 (1875); 2 GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN
MISSOURI 890-895 (1949).
17. Supra, note 16.
18. Starr v. Bartz, supra, note 16.
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not clear whether this rule would apply in Missouri where the conveyance by the
record owner is by warranty deed. But there is indication that it would apply since
the cases uniformly hold that title acquired by adverse possession is for all purposes
as good as if acquired by deed from the record owner.19 In support of this also are
the holdings that the recording act does not apply to title acquired by adverse
20
possession.
Although knowledge of possession will generally be evidence of actual notice
to the purchaser, where the person in possession holds an interest which is of record
and there are no circumstances which indicate that he is in possession other than
under the recorded instrument, such possession is not evidence of actual notice to
the purchaser of any unrecorded title or interest which the possessor holds. In
Moeller v. Holthaus,21 the possessor held a lease for a nominal rental from the defendant's grantor. The possessor also held an unrecorded vendor's lien on the property. The court of appeals held that the defendant had a right to rely upon the
recorded instrument as being the possessor's right to possession and in such case the
defendant was not bound to inquire into the possessor's interest.
In spite of these decisions holding that possession is only evidence of actual
notice to the subsequent purchaser, the courts of Missouri have not always been too
careful of the language used in their decisions. Frequently the statement appears
in a decision that possession is notice to a subsequent purchaser of the possessor's
interest with no indication in the case as to whether the subsequent purchaser must
know of the possession.22 And frequently it is not clear from the facts whether
it was found in the lower court that the purchaser knew of the possession.23 But in
Jones v. Nichols,24 and Desteiguer v. Martin, 25 it is clear that the court considered
possession of itself to be notice without knowledge of the possession on the part of
the purchaser. In the Desteiguer case the court indicated that notice could be inferred from possession alone. In that case the lower court instructed the jury that
if the plaintiff knew the defendant was in possession, it was sufficient to put the
plaintiff on inquiry and the judgment should be for the defendant unless it was
19. Ibid; Ridgeway v. Holliday, supra, note 16; Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo.
596 (1869).
20. McAboy v. Packer, supra, note 16, supra, note 18.
21. 12 Mo. A pp. 526 (1882). In accord: Sikes v. Turner, 212 Mo. App. 419,
247 S.W. 803 (1923).
22. Johnson v. Moore, 346 Mo. 854, 143 S.W. 2d 254 (1940); Chilton v. Cady,
298 Mo. 101, 250 S.W. 403 (1923); Swift v. Buford, 280 Mo. 432, 217 S.W. 980
1920); Titus v. North Kansas City Development Co., 264 Mo. 229, 174 S.W. 432
1915); Gulley v. Waggoner, 255 Mo. 613, 164 S.W. 557 (1914); Squires v. Kimball,
208 Mo. 119, 106 S.W. 503 (1907); Stuart v. Ramsey, 196 Mo. 404, 415, 95 S.W.
382, 385 (1906); Myers v. Schuchmann, 182 Mo. 159, 81 S. W. 618 (1904); Wiggenhorn v. Daniels, 149 Mo. 160, 165, 50 S.W. 807, 808 (1899); Davis v. Briscoe, 81
Mo. 27 (1883).
23. Chilton v. Cady, supra,note 22; Titus v. North Kansas City Development
Co., 264 Mo. 229, 174 S.W. 807 (1914); Shaffer v. Detie, 191 Mo. 377, 90 S.W. 131
(1905); Myers v. Schuchmann, supra, note 22.
24. 280 Mo. 653, 216 S.W. 962 (1919).
25. 162 Mo. 417, 63 S.W. 107 (1901).
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found that the plaintiff did actually inquire and was unable to ascertain the defendant's interest. In approving this instruction the court held that the plaintiff
had no grounds for complaint since the instruction was more favorable to him than
should be because in it "plaintiff was not charged with the inference of notice to be
drawn from defendant's possession of the land as might properly have been
done; .... " In the Jones case the court held that "open, exclusive, separate and
distinct possession . . . is and was notice to the world"20 of all the rights of the

possessor. The result of these cases is not contrary to the holdings of the Drey
case and the Vaughn case when it is noted that in all of these cases the purchaser
knew of the possession from which notice could have been inferred by the jury. But
such language as used renders the cases of no value as precedent for subsequent
litigation where the facts are different from the facts of those cases.
But where the issue has been directly before the court as to whether possession
is notice without knowledge of the possession on the part of the subsequent purchaser, the rule set forth in the Drey case has generally been followed and it
is held that possession of itself is not notice to the purchaser of the possessor's
interest, but is merely evidence from which notice may be inferred by the
jury.27 In Whitma v. Taylor,28 the court held that the defendant's position
that since he was in possession the plaintiff had notice of his interest, was untenable
since there was no averment that the plaintiff knew of the possession at the time of
the purchase. In the Vaughn case, 29 the court said: "It is true, the circumstances
may be such as to show conclusively that the purchaser did not, in fact, know that
any one was in possession, . . and in such case, the jury, of course could not find
the fact of actual notice."
Altfiough the doctrine in the Drey case is the generally accepted law of this
state, attorneys continue to cite Beatie v. Butler 0 without regard to the fact that
it has been so often criticized and questioned that for all practical purposes it has
been overruled on this point. In the Beatie case, Judge Scott said: "What is actual
notice, we conceive, is a question of fact for the jury.

. .

. The jury will only find

the facts when such evidence has been submitted to them as produce the conviction
that the purchaser was really aware of the existence of the instrument which he
seeks to defeat at the time of his purchase." 3' Judge Ryland dissented from this
discussion concerning possession as notice. This decision by Judge Scott was not
followed in the Vaughn case one year later and was questioned in Maupin v. Einmons.32 The case was often questioned by the courts when cited by counsel as
26. Emphasis added.
27. McBride Realty Co. v. Grave, 223 Mo. App. 588, 15 S.W. 2d 957 (1929);
Masterson v. West End R.R., 5 Mo. App. 64 (1878); affd. 72 Mo. 342 (1880);
Whitman v. Taylor, 60 Mo. 127 (1875). Shumate v. Reavis, 49 Mo. 333 (1872);
Harrison v. Cachelin, 23 Mo. 117 (18565.
28.

Supra, n. 27.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Supra, n. 7, 22 Mo. at 422.
21 Mo. 313, 64 Am. Dec. 234 (1855).
In accord: Frothington v. Stacker, 11 Mo. 77 (1847).
Supra, note 9.
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33
authority on this point. But in Kansas City Granite and Monument Co. v. Jordan,
the Beatie case was cited by counsel and favorably considered by the court. In the
Kansas City Monwmetit Co. case, the defendant was claiming under an unrecordea
deed. But while this alleged deed was in existence, defendant testified under oath
in an action to which both the plaintiff and defendant were parties that defendant's
possession was by virtue of a tenancy under the plaintiff's grantor. Therefore it is
doubtful that an inquiry by the plaintiff would have elicited the defendant's alleged
interest. There was also evidence, both from witnesses and in the deed held by the
defendant, that the deed had been altered and was invalid. Therefore, it is doubtful
that the application of the doctrine of the Beatie case was necessary for a proper
determination of the issues in the case.

A purchaser of realty who purchases such without actual notice of an unrecorded
interest in the realty takes perfect title to the realty. Therefore such purchaser can
convey good title to another purchaser even though the latter has actual notice of
the unrecorded interest.3 4 This is true even though the last conveyance is by quitclaim deed, but such acquired interest is good only as against those prior equities
5
to which the recording act applies and which could be recorded thereunder.3 Also
a purchaser with actual notice of an unrecorded interest can convey good title to a
36
purchaser without actual notice of the interest.
Another problem which may frequently arise here is that of agency. The same
rules of agency apply here as in other transactions and an agent's knowledge will be
imputed to his principal. Knowledge on the part of the agent which would be evidence of actual notice to him were he the purchaser, will be imputed to his principal.3 7 In regard to this problem, the same attorney or broker often acts as agent of
both the vendor and the purchaser. That agent will frequently have knowledge of
the possession by a third party. The attorney or broker acting as agent of both the
vendor and the purchaser should remember that he must reveal to the purchaser
any circumstances of which he has knowledge which would affect the title to the
realty.
The problem discussed herein arises less frequently in Missouri today than
formerly. The commercial practices are such that a case will seldom arise today in
which the purchaser of realty will not know of the possession of the realty by a third
party. Land plays much less part in commercial transactions today than in past
years, and the modem modes of transportation and communication make examination of the premises much easier for the absentee purchaser of realty-either personally or through an agent. Also the land speculation of early days where land
was often bought and sold without examination of the premises is of little preva33. 16 Mo. 1118, 295 S.W. 763 (1927).
34. Drey v. Doyle, note 11, supra;Lemay v. Poupenez, 35 Mo. 71 (1864).
35. Hendricks v. Calloway, 211 Mo. 536, 111 S.W. 60 (1908).
36. Drey v. Doyle, supra, note 11; Bartlett v. Glasscock, 4 Mo. 62 (1835).
37. Hickman v. Green, 123 Mo. 165 (1894), questioned on another point in
Morrison v. Juden, 145 Mo. 282 at 303 (1898); Meier v. Blume, 80 Mo. 179

(1883).
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lence in Missouri today. But if a purchaser does buy without knowledge of an unrecorded interest or. knowledge of possession under an unrecorded instrument, the
Missouri cases contain adequate authority for a successful litigation of the question
by such purchaser.
The purchaser of realty should not feel that the law of Missouri as set out in
the foregoing discussion, as a practical matter, gives him a license to safely purchase
realty without an examination of the premises to determine whether a third party
is in possession. If a third party is in possession under an unrecorded instrument,
and the matter gets into litigation, there is always the possibility that the possessor
will be able to put in sufficient evidence to show that his possession was of such an
open and notorious character that the jury will infer actual notice to the purchaser
of the possessor's interest with little or no evidence that the purchaser in fact knew
of the possession. There is the further possibilty that an agent through whom the
subsequent purchaser may deal will have knowledge in fact of the possession by a
third party under an unrecorded instrument, and this knowledge may be imputed
to the purchaser. Under any circumstances the matter is almost certain to get into
litigation. For the same reasons a purchaser of realty should never rely entirely
upon a recorded lease where a tenant is in possession of the realty. An attorney
giving a title opinion should always provide against the possibility that the realty
is in the possession of a third party by inserting a provision in his opinion that the
title is subject to the rights of any parties in possession. This provision will in no
way affect the title which the purchaser gets, but will protect the attorney from
liability and the client from litigation in the event there is a third party in possession under an unrecorded interest.
The foregoing discussion has been written without consideration of the National Housing Act.38 What effect national control of housing in those areas subject
to such control has upon the Missouri law on the problem herein discussed can be
left only to speculation. But it is probable that the rights of a tenant under the
federal act cannot be altered by the Missouri law in the case of a party purchasing
property without actual notice that a tenant is in possession.
BRUCE A. RING
AN INCONSISTENCY

IN JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF

Laissez Faire

Political and economic theory must always face at some point the problem of
the proper role of government both as it pertains to persons and to things.
Granted that on the one hand a policy of pure laissez-faire has never characterized
any government and that on the other no government can continue to exist without
the acquiescence of the governed; the problem still remains as to the most desirable
relationship between governmental power and the citizen. This is a problem in
values but the social scientist may be able to shed some light upon the possibilities
involved as well as the contradictions which frequently exist between explicit
action and implicit assumption.
38. Housing and Rent Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §1881 et. seq. (Supp. Pamph. 1951).
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One area of even more confusion than most is that separating governmental
intervention in economic activities and governmental intervention in civil liberties.
It is urged on the one hand that any governmental action of a regulatory character
automaticall j involves a diminution of individual freedom whether the regulation
is directed at property or. persons, while on the other it is often stated that the
only manner in which men can hope to attain greater individual freedom is through
the collective power of government.
Those who most vociferously object to the regulation of business enterprise
frequently base their arguments upon the premise that any regulation of property
rights constitutes an automatic invasion of personal freedom which is contrary to
the democratic philosophy. It is not the purpose of this paper to either support
or attack such a premise but merely to attempt to show that as the argument has
sometimes been advanced by the members of the Supreme Court'it has reflected
some puzzling inconsistencies.
It is customary to think of the conservative justices sitting on the Supreme
Court bench during the early 1930's as being reluctant to sanction governmental
interference with business activities. In the main this popular conception is
firmly based on the evidence, for VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler
objected frequently and at length to attempts on the part of the state and federal
governments to regulate prices, competitive conditions, and employer-employee relations or contracts.
Analysis of the opinions which the above justices either wrote or to which
they signified their approval has disclosed that in economic 'philosophy they indicated a remarkably close relationship to the laissez-faire economists.
It is not necessary to indicate agreement with a laissez-faire policy in order to
recognize the logical consistency of such men as Jean B. Say, David Ricardo or J. R.
McCulloch as long as their assumptions are granted, nor is there any need to
quarrel with the ultimate goals of these men. Equating individual freedom with
economic freedom was certainly entirely consistent with the conditions of free
competition and known self-interest which they assumed. The Supreme Court
justices VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, however, were by no
means as consistent in the application of such a policy as were the economists whose
philosophy they implicitly imitated.
An understanding of the distaste with which these justices viewed governmental
interference with the operation of the economy can be gained from the dicta with
which their opinions were so liberally salted. For example, New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman raised the question of whether a state could, through the use of the
"certificate of public convenience" regulate entry into the ice business. The Oklahoma statute which had implemented such regulation was found by Sutherland to
be unconstitutional, for "Plainly a regulation which has the effect of denying or
unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business,
1. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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such as that under review, cannot be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under that amendment, nothing is more clearly settled than that it is
beyond the power of a state, 'under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily
[to] interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.'"2
A number of other statutes were found equally objectionable by the conservative justices; among them the New York Milk Control Act, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act and the New York Wages and Hours Act. Justice McReynolds objected in strong language to the regulation of the price of milk which was
accomplished by the New York Milk Control Act, and which the Court majority
found to be permissible under the Constitution.3 McReynolds' reasoning was also
based upon the assumption that an interference with market prices constituted a
diminution of individual liberty which was contrary to the Constitution. He said:
"Not only does the statute interfere arbitrarily with the rights of the little grocer to
conduct his business according to standards long accepted--complete destruction
may follow; but it takes away the liberty of twelve million consumers to buy a
necessity of life in an open market. It imposes direct and arbitrary burdens upon
those already seriously impoverished with the alleged immediate design of affording
special benefit to others ...
"The statement by the court below that--'Doubtless the statute before us would
be condemned by an earlier generation as a temarious interference with the rights
of property and contract . . . ; with the natural law of supply and demand' is

obviously correct."4
Justice Butler objected to another New York statute on the grounds that
individual liberties were invaded. This objection reflected the views of the majority
of the Court with respect to the wage and hour law of that state. In this case,
Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo,5 Justice Butler following the dicta of earlier
cases,6 declared: "The right to make contracts about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty protected by the due process clause. Within this liberty are provisions of
contracts between employer and employee fixing the wages to be paid. In making
contracts of employment, generally speaking, the parties have equal rights to obtain
from each other the best terms they can by private bargaining."'
The same group of justices objected to the federal government's efforts to
guarantee collective bargaining,8 to set aside the gold clauses in private and public
2. Id. at 278, citing Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924)
and Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928).
3. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
4. Id. at 557.
5. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
6. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
7. 298 U.S. at 610.
8. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Co., 301 U.S. 49
(1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 at p. 76
(1937).
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contracts, to modify the use of injunctions in industrial disputes,' 0 and the states'
9

power to modify a mortgage contract.-

In each case the objection was stated in

terms of the resulting diminution of individual freedom which presumably such
regulation entailed.
In view of this record it would be logical to expect that VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler would view governmental interference with civil
liberties with equal repugnance. That is, if the government's attempts to interfere
with the "normal" operation of the economy were rejected on the grounds that
they unconstitutionally diminished the individual's freedom, consistency would seem
to indicate that a direct regulation of the individual's freedom of expression would
be similarly viewed. Such, however, was not always the case.
Near v. Minnesota'2 brought before the Court a state act which provided for
the use of the injunction against businesses which made it a practice of publishing
material of a scandalous or defamatory nature. The facts in the case were not
contested. Indeed, excerpts from Near's publication included in the margin by
Justice Butler indicate that he was engaged in the publication of an anti-semitic hate
sheet. The problem before the Court, however, was larger than a mere evaluation
of Near's publication, The Saturday Press. Speaking for the majority, which found
the statute in violation of the First Amendment, Chief Justice Hughes summarized
the situation as follows:
"If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of
the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring the owner
or publisher of a newspaper or. periodical before a judge upon a charge of
conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matterin particular that the matter consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction-and unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to
bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true
and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper
or periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a
.
contempt. This is of the essence of censorship. " 13
Justice Butler, in spite of his usual concern that the individual's freedom be protected from governmental intervention, took the position that in this case the
interference of the State of Minnesota was entirely justified. In his dissenting
opinion, in which he was joined by Justices VanDevanter, Sutherland and McReynolds, he said:
"The decision of the Court in this case declares Minnesota and every other
State powerless to restrain by injunction the business of publishing and
circulating among the people malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodi-

9.
294 U.S.
10.
301 U.S.
11.
12.
13.

Norman v. B. & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States,
317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
Lauf v. Shinner and Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
468 (1937).
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 713.
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cals that in due course of judicial procedure has been adjudged to be a
public nuisance. 1'
Attention must be called to the fact that the Minnesota statute was directed
at preventing continuing publication on the basis of the past record of the publisher
and that while The Saturday Press could by no stretch of the imagination be considered a publication with an acceptable record, the injunction was aimed not at the
past sins of the periodical but at its future course. The publisher was to be enjoined from continuing in the business. This Butler condoned although he had
repeatedly raised objections to state interference with the individual's right to
"enter a common calling."
In this case, however, Butler did not emphasize the importance of the individual's "right" to carry on his business without outside interference; on the
contrary he viewed the statute as one designed to preserve the "good order of
[the] community." The shift in emphasis was significant. The very nature of the
business in which Near was engaged had led the majority of the Court to find
that the state had overstepped its powers by making that business subject to an
injunctive order to cease operation. The very nature of the business however was
the basis of Butler's finding that the statute should have been upheld as a constitutional exercise of the state's power. "The doctrine that measures such as the one
before us are invalid because they operate as previous restraints to infringe freedom
of press exposes the peace and good order of every community and the business
and private affairs of every individual to the constant and protracted false and
malicious assaults of any insolvent publisher who may have purpose and sufficient
capacity to contrive and put into effect a scheme or program for oppression, blackmail or extortion." 15
It is also important to note that the Minnesota statute provided that a publisher hailed before a court to show cause as to why his publication should not be
enjoined was required to show, not only that the material he published was true,
but that it was published "with good motives." The breadth of such power is
immediately apparent when the matter of proving "motive" is considered. As Chief
Justice Hughes remarked, any attack upon a public official could be considered a
scandal and the publication which had made the attack presumably enjoined from
further publication under the terms of the statute.10
The justices who would have upheld this statute placed themselves in the position where they would condone governmental interference with the business of publishing material for the public to a greater extent than they would condone such
interferences with the other types of business activity. This would appear to be an
inconsistency in the reasoning of this group of Supreme Court Justices. In terms
of the application of a laissez-faire policy it was. In terms of another attitude of
these justices it was entirely consistent.
14. Id. at 723.
15. Id. at "737-38.
16. Id. at 711.
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A laissez-faire economic policy during the early 1930's was essentially conservative and most consistent with maintaining the status quo. The attitude of
Butler which his opinion in the Near case reflected, was also conservative and essentially aimed at maintaining the status quo. He said: "The Act was passed in
the exertion of the State's power of police, and this court is by well established
rule required to assume, until the contrary is clearly made to appear, that there
exists in Minnesota a state of affairs that justifies this measure for the preservation
of the peace and good order of the State." 17
. The point is not whether or not the Minnesota statute
should or should not
have been upheld by the Suprmee Court but merely that the very members of the
Court who were most opposed to governmental intervention in the economic activities of persons both real and corporate were not opposed to the type of intervention
which the statute contemplated.
EDWARD
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17. Id. at 731.
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